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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
The First Circuit has taken the best approach to the problem by
requiring that a section 2255 motion must be heard by a judge
other than the one who presided at trial .3" Grounded on the
court's supervisory power, not the due process clause,0 2 that rule
recognizes the difficulty of disqualifying a judge, as well as the
potential for abuse when a judge is called on to reverse his own
decision.
VI. EXTRAJUDICIAL DETENTIONS
A. Review of Courts-Martial
This section concerns the right of persons convicted by courts-
martial to turn to federal civilian courts, through habeas corpus,
to attack their confinements.' The most critical issue in the
field is the range of issues cognizable by the civilian court. This
section suggests that the present range of issues cognizable is
unnecessarily narrow and should be broadened so that military
wanted the trial judge to preside. Indeed the advantages of section 2255 can all be
achieved if the case is heard in the sentencing district, regardless of which judge
hears it. According to the Senate committee report the purpose of the bill was to
make the proceeding a part of the criminal action so the court could resentence the
applicant, or grant him a new trial. (A judge presiding over a habeas corpus action
does not have these powers.) In addition, Congress did not want the cases heard
in the district of confinement because that tended to concentrate the burden on a
few districts, and made it difficult for witnesses and records to be produced. S. REP.
No. 1526, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (X948). Considering the danger of abuse that
exists when a judge is called upon to review his own decisions, it seems ill-advised
to "supplement legislative history that contains no such suggestion, and which
demonstrates concern with quite a different matter." Halliday v. United States,
380 F.2d 270, 273 (ist Cir. 1967).
361 Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270 (Ist Cir. 1967) (Aldrich, C.J.).
The First Circuit's rule does not bar the trial judge from deciding whether a
section 2255 application warrants a hearing. This decision is to be made according
to the "files and records of the case," 28 ZU.S.C. § 2255 (x964), which plainly does
not include the judge's personal recollections of the case. The First Circuit also
recognized that problems may arise if the district court has only one judge, and
stated that in such a case the sentencing judge could preside at the hearing. The
problem is not of much significance, however, since there are only seven such
districts in the United States.
362 It would be difficult to formulate a constitutional rule requiring the disquali-
fication of a district judge solely because he presided at trial. Cf. Ungar v.
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584 (1964) ("We cannot assume that judges are so irascible
and sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially deal with resistance to their
authority or with highly charged arguments about the soundness of their deci-
sions.").
" Beyond the scope of this section are the problems of review and control of
the extraordinary organs, such as military commissions, established under military
government and martial law, as well as problems of international character, such
as habeas corpus review of international military tribunals or the obstacles aliens
face in obtaining review of military convictions.
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court detentions are treated in the same manner as state court
detentions. The section then turns briefly to a discussion of the
applicability of such habeas doctrines as custody, waiver, and
exhaustion to the court-martialed prisoner.
i. Historical Overview. - The problems of habeas corpus re-
view of a court-martial, conviction first reached the Supreme
Court in 1879 in Ex parte Reed.' There the Court laid down
narrow limits on the issues cognizable: civilian courts, it was
said, could inquire whether the court-martial had jurisdiction
over the person and subject matter and had the power to impose
the sentence. Habeas was not to serve as appellate review; "mere
error or irregularity" was not sufficient to impeach the court-
martial judgment.' These limits, identical to those imposed in
previous collateral attacks on military judicial decisions,4 were
at least as narrow as those placed on habeas review of civilian con-
victions at the time.' These early cases reflect the original con-
2 100 U.S. 13.
Id. at 23.
4 Both the state courts, cf. In re Reynolds, 2o F. Cas. 592, 598 (No. 2x,722)
(N.D.N.Y. 1867) (summary of state cases), and the lower federal courts, e.g., Ex
parte Henderson, ii F, Cas. io67, io68 (No. 6349) (C.C.D. Ky. I878), had ap-
plied the same standards used in Reed in reviewing the convictions of court-
martialed prisoners. State jurisdiction to hear military habeas corpus petitions
was eliminated in Tarble's Case, 8o U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872). Federal courts
handling habeas petitions by persons under sentence of a military commission
had inquired only into jurisdiction, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (Q Wall.) 2
(1866).
At the time of Reed there was another form of collateral attack consisting of
a suit for damages against the individual who carried out the court-martial sen-
tence; the only issue cognizable was jurisdiction, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 6i U.S.
(2o How.) 65, 82-83 (1858) (assault, battery, and false imprisonment). See also
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (22 Wheat.) 19 (2827) (replevin); Wise v. Withers, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (i8o6) (trespass). Later, suits were allowed against the
United States for lost pay, giving another vehicle for collateral attack on the same
theoretical basis as the Dynes approach. E.g., United States v. Brown, 206 U.S.
240 (I9o7); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887). Here too the issue
cognizable was originally jurisdiction only. Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336,
340 (x883). See note 70 infra.
' See pp. 1042-55 supra. See also Katz & Nelson, The Need for Clarification in
Military Habeas Corpus, 27 O1o ST. L.J. 193, 212 (1966). The Court recognized
this relation in Reed when it declared that court-martial judgments "are sur-
rounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments
of other legal tribunals . . . ." ioo U.S. at 23.
In fact, a strong argument can be made that court-martial judgments were
more vulnerable to jurisdictional attacks than were civilian judgments. Authority
for this position includes Chief Justice Marshall's explanation in Ex parte Watkins,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) X93, 209 (1830) (dictum) (unsuccessful habeas attack on a
federal court conviction) of his earlier decision in Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 331 (18o6) (successful collateral attack on court-martial for lack of
120 9
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ception of the writ as a guardian against the unauthorized use
of adjudicatory power.6 The paramount policy was to restrict
the military to its "appropriate sphere" 7 in accordance with this
nation's historic fear of "the corrosive effect upon liberty of
exaggerated military power." 8
At the start of the twentieth century the range of issues
cognizable expanded, evidently in response to a feeling that ha-
beas should serve not only to restrict the military courts to their
proper sphere but also to protect those properly within the reach
of courts-martial from a misuse of power. To the traditional
issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction 10 and legality
of sentence were added the questions whether the court-martial
jurisdiction over person in a suit for damages against the executor of the sentence):
[Wise] proves only that a court martial was considered as one of those
inferior courts of limited jurisdiction, whose judgments may be questioned
collaterally. They are not placed on the same high ground with the judg-
ments of a court of record. [That case] . . . is no authority for inquiring
into the judgments of a court of general criminal jurisdiction ...
The Court in McClaughry v. Deming, I86 U.S. 49, 63, 68-69 (1902) (dictum) ex-
plained that one consequence of the inferiority of courts-martial was that, unlike
civilian convictions, all jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain the court-martial
judgment in the face of collateral attack must appear of record; they could not
be inferred argumentatively, and no presumptions existed in favor of the court-
martial's jurisdiction. This rule theoretically allowed the petitioner to assail every
fact necessary to jurisdiction and to introduce proof thereon, while the military
could do no more than present the record. This rule had little practical effect,
however, and was discarded in Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 1i, 19-20 (1921). See
also Fratcher, Review by the Civil Courts of Judgments of Federal Military
Tribunals, io OHIO ST. L.J. 271, 298-30o (i949).
6 See p. 1042-55 sUpra.
' O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
' Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. x8i, 182
(1962).
I A similar, contemporary expansion of federal habeas corpus was occurring
with respect to review of state convictions; see pp. 1045-62 Supra.
"°Recent cases have demonstrated the continued vitality of jurisdictional ha-
beas corpus. It served as the vehicle for the constitutional redefinition of personal
and subject matter jurisdiction of courts-martial. Those eliminated from personal
jurisdiction include: civilian dependents of military personnel, Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (ig6o); civilian employees of the military,
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (196o); discharged
soldiers, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. II (ix5g). These cases,
of course, deal with peacetime court-martial jurisdiction flowing from U.S. CoNST.
art. I, § 8, cI. 14; courts-martial in wartime can exercise much wider jurisdiction
by virtue of the war powers. U.S. CousT. art. I, § 8, cl. ix-6. The expansion of
jurisdiction is provided for in Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2(xo), 1o
U.S.C. § 802(1o) (1964). See Wiener, Courts Martial for Civilians Accompanying
the Armed Forces in Vietnam, 54 A.B.A.J. 24 (1968); 67 MICH. L. REV. 84X (1969).
Similarly, subject matter jurisdiction has contracted. Although always limited
to crimes, recently jurisdiction was severely narrowed to "service connected"
crimes. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (i969), noted in The Supreme Court,
xg68 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 212 (z969).
[Vol. 83:10o381210
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violated the statutes governing its proceedings or basic notions
of fairness. Inquiry into these two questions was had by stretch-
ing the concept of jurisdiction, which was still said to be the only
issue cognizable. The leading case on statutory violations is
McClaughry v. Deming," where an officer of the Volunteer Army
was tried by a court-martial composed wholly of officers of the
Regular Army - a clear violation of Article of War 77 of
1874.12 The Court reasoned that since the court-martial is a
creation of statute, any act by it beyond or inconsistent with its
governing statutes is void; or, in the terminology of the day, the
court-martial lacked jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter since it was illegally constituted. 3
Deming could have led to quite considerable civilian review.
Its rationale was not limited to statutes governing the convening
of courts-martial, but could be used to require conformity to
statutes and regulations governing all stages of the proceedings.
The current statutory 14 and regulatory 15 framework is detailed,
and enforcing conformity by habeas would permit close super-
vision by civilian courts. Further, since the statutes and regula-
tions reiterate many constitutional rights,' 6 the Deming approach
would allow civilian courts to protect these rights without neces-
sitating direct review of constitutional issues. Accordingly, some
courts 17 and commentators 11 have lauded Deming as a way to
ensure basic fairness in courts-martial without completely aban-
doning the concept of jurisdictional habeas corpus. On the other
hand, Deming's formalistic approach raises conceptual difficul-
11 186 U.S. 49 (1902).
12 REv. STAT. tit. XIV, ch. 5, § 1342, art. 77 (1874), reprinted in 2 W. WIn-
THROP, MILITARY LAW, app., 121 (1886).
2 186 U.S. at 69.
14 Uniform Code of Military Justice, io U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1969) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
15MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1969 rev. ed.), Exec. Order
No. 11,476, 34 Fed. Reg. 10502 (June 28, 1969) [hereinafter cited as MCM
(i969)]. The Manual is promulgated by the President pursuant to the authority
granted in UCMJ art. 36.
"
0E.g., UCMJ art. 44 (former jeopardy); MCM (1969) ff i52 (illegal search),
i5o(b) (self-incrimination), ff 140(a)(2) (Miranda warnings), II 149(b) (right
to cross-examine). See UCMJ art. 36 (the rules prescribed by the President
"shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules
of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts, but which may not be . . . inconsistent with" the UCMJ).
" E.g., Juhl v. United States, 383 F.2d xoo9, 1020-23 (Ct. CI. 1967), rev'd
sub nom. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 352 (i969). See notes 20 &
115 infra. The effect of this case on the present status of Deming is considered at
p. 1227 infra.
18 E.g., Schwartz, Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial Deviations from the Ar-
ticles of War, 14 Mo. L. REv. 147 (1949).
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ties. In a plain sense, not every statutory provision or regulation
can rise to a jurisdictional level.19 Thus Deming calls for a
determination of which parts of the directive framework are
"jurisdictional," but the courts were unable to articulate any vi-
able, definite standards.20 Another difficulty with the Deming
approach is that, in theory, it might lead to a habeas court's en-
forcing a statutory command but not a constitutional provision.21
For example, a relatively insignificant violation of a statute,
which had previously been declared jurisdictional in an appeal-
ing case, would void a court-martial, while essential constitutional
rights not spelled out in the statutes or regulations could be wil-
fully ignored.
1" The very detail of the directive framework which creates Deming's potential
for expansion makes it impossible for the civilian court to require precise conform-
ance. For example, it would be unthinkable that a habeas court, under the guise
of divestiture of jurisdiction, could void a court-martial for violation of the regu-
lation which allows the accused to wear his decorations at trial, MCM (1969)
fi 6o.
"oThere was a general tendency to classify as jurisdictional those statutes
dealing with the manner of convening the court-martial. E.g., United States v.
Smith, I97 U.S. 386, 392 (19O5) (dictum) (convening officer must be authorized
by statute or by President to appoint court-martial); McClaughry v. Deming,
186 U.S. 49 (1902); McDaniel v. Hiatt, 78 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Pa. 1948) (dictum)
(minimum number of court-martial members fixed by statute must be met). Some
statutes which went to the basic fairness of trial were also classified as jurisdic-
tional. E.g., Juhl v. United States, 383 F.2d 1009, 1023 (Ct. Cl. 1967), rev'd sub
no.n.United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 352 (i969). In that case the
lower court in a suit for damages allowed collateral attack on the grounds that
the conviction was based on accomplice testimony in violation of executive regula-
tion, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (951), ff 153(a), Exec. Order
No. 10,214, i6 Fed. Reg. 1385-86 (rg5i) [hereinafter cited as MCM (x95I)].
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the rule was not of constitutional stature
but providing no further explanation. See p. 1228 & notes 70 & 15 infra.
On the other hand, courts have classified as directory, rather than jurisdictional,
those statutes which are primarily procedural. E.g., McMicking v. Schields, 238
U.S. 99 (I915) (failure to follow executive regulation requiring that the accused
be granted two days to prepare defense) ; United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, i41
F.2d 664, 667 (3d Cir. I944) (violation of statute by court conferring with the
trial judge-advocate in absence of accused). Statutes that were discretionary re-
ceived similar treatment. E.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 107-10 (950)
(appointment of a qualified law member was required if one was "available for
the purpose"; since discretion was allowed a role by terms of the statute, there
could be no successful attack, at least in the absence of gross abuse of discretion) ;
Swaim v. United States, Y65 U.S. 553, 559-60 (x897) (officer shall not be tried
by those inferior in rank "when it can be avoided"); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S.
(i2 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (3 members of court-martial required where possible
"without manifest injury to the service").
21 The statement in text clearly assumes that the constitutional rights of service-
men are to be protected. Whatever doubt there once may have been about the
point seems to have been settled by Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142-43 (953).
See also note 83 infra.
[Vol. 83 :10381212
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The Deming approach was eventually cast aside by the lower
federal courts in favor of a more straightforward decision to re-
view constitutional claims on habeas corpus.22 In the I940's, at
least five circuit courts, following the expansion of habeas for
civilians in Johnson v. Zerbst,23 ruled constitutional claims cog-
nizable, although all decided adversely to the petitioner on the
merits. 24 The Third Circuit said: 25
We think that this basic guarantee of fairness afforded by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment applies to a defendant
in criminal proceedings in a federal military court as well as in
a federal civil court. An individual does not cease to be a person
within the protection of the fifth amendment of the Constitution
because he has joined the nation's armed forces and has taken
the oath to support that Constitution with his life, if need be.
The propriety of this expanded approach squarely reached 21
2 Early cases that considered constitutional claims did so carefully within the
traditional language of divestiture of jurisdiction and all decided adversely to the
petitioner. E.g., McMicking v. Schields, 238 U.S. 99, io6 (i9,5) (due process);
Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 387-96, 401 (1902) (double jeopardy);
Johnson v. Sayre, i58 U.S. io9, ii6 (1895) (cruel and unusual punishment).
22 304 U.S. 458 (,938).
24 Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 874 (X949); Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 512 (ioth Cir. 1948); United
States ex rel. Weintraub v. Swenson, I65 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1948) (semble);
United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 14x F.2d 664 (3d Cir. i944) ; Schita v. King,
133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943) (remanded for new hearing; on remand, held, no
due process violation, aff'd sub nom. Schita v. Cox, 239 F.2d 971, cert. denied,
322 U.S. 761 (1944)).
Other circuit courts looked into constitutional claims adversely to the peti-
tioner without feeling called upon to decide the applicability of Zerbst to courts-
martial. E.g., Hironimus v. Durant, i68 F.2d 288 (4 th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 818 (1948); Wrublewski v. McInerney, i66 F.2d 243 (9 th "Cir. 1948); Waite
v. Overlade, 264 F.2d 722 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 812 (1948). District
courts in yet other circuits felt free to look into due process claims along Zerbst
lines. E.g., Boone v. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 807 (D. Me. 1947).
Furthermore, in 1947 the Court of Claims, in a suit for lost pay, allowed the
first successful collateral attack of a court-martial judgment on grounds of viola-
tions of constitutional rights; in overruling the defendant's demurrer, the court
found that denial of fifth amendment due process and sixth amendment right to
counsel divested jurisdiction. Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl.
2947). The government, choosing not to appeal, stipulated judgment. io8 Ct. Cl.
754 (1947). Shapiro has been approved consistently by the Court of Claims, which
has also somewhat slighted the importance of Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137
(I953). See, e.g., Augenblick v. United States, 377 F.2d 586, 591-93 (Ct. Cl. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 348 (i969); Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d
949, 953-54 (Ct. CI. I966); cases cited in Katz & Nelson, supra note 5, at 216
n. 139. But cf. Begalke v. United States, 286 F.2d 6o6, 6o8 (Ct. Cl. ig6o). See also
note 70 infra.
25 United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944).
2 6 Although this issue was present in two cases in 1949, the Supreme Court
avoided deciding it. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 697 (i949), rev'g Smith
121 3
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the Supreme Court in i95o. The Fifth Circuit in Hiatt v.
Brown" had affirmed a district court's release order 2 on two
grounds: that the court-martial was constituted in violation of
the statute 29 and that the record showed prejudicial errors de-
priving the petitioner of due process. 30 The Supreme Court re-
versed the former ground, 31 and then ruled that the lower "court
was in error in extending its review, for the purpose of deter-
mining compliance with the due process clause, to such mat-
ters" 32 as the alleged errors. Correction of these errors, said
the Court, was committed solely to the military authorities.
"'The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.' " 33 Jurisdictional
inquiry was defined to include determining whether there was
jurisdiction of the person accused and the offense charged and
whether the court-martial "acted within its lawful powers." 31
For several reasons the Court's decision in Hiatt v. Brown
did not induce federal courts to refrain from reviewing alleged
court-martial denials of constitutional rights .3 First, the Su-
preme Court's failure to explain why contemporary advances
made in civilian habeas should not be extended to the court-
martialed prisoner encouraged lower courts to seek ways to avoid
the obstacle to review that Hiatt seemed to present. Second, the
v. Hiatt, I70 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. x948) (reversed on the ground that the violated
statute in question was directory, not jurisdictional; the due process argument
was dispensed with by observing the absence of a "finding that there was unfair-
ness in the court-martial trial itself"); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (x949),
aff'g i69 F.2d 973 (ioth Cir. 1948) (affirmed on the basis of invalidity of a double
jeopardy claim; no consideration of the propriety of examining the constitutional
claim).
27 175 F.2d 273 (1949).
28 Brown v. Hiatt, 8i F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
29 The circuit court interpreted Article of War 8 of 1920, ch. 227, subch. II,
§ I, 41 Stat. 788, as requiring the presence of a law member from the Judge Advo-
cate General's Department unless such officer was in fact unavailable. The court
held that the record showed such an officer to be available and that failure to
appoint him law member was in disregard of this requirement. 175 F.2d at 276.
"The circuit court cited the following errors: the court-martial and the re-
viewing authorities misconceived the applicable law; the law member and defense
counsel were grossly incompetent; there was no pretrial investigation; the evi-
dence as to certain elements of the crime was insufficient. 175 F.2d at 277.
31 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 203, x07-10 (zg5o) ; see note 20 supra.
2 Id. at ixo.
I d. at iii, quoting from In re Grimley, 137 U.S. X47, 150 (1890).
34339 U.S. at xii.
"2E.g., Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 2952), aff'd sub nom. Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (i953); Kuykendall v. Hunter, 187 F.2d 545, 546 (zoth
Cir. I95I) (dictum) ("Due process of law must be observed in military trials the
same as trials in civil courts"; the court does not cite Hiatt v. Brown). See
Snedeker, Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial Prisoners, 6 VAND. L. REV. 288, 297
& n.9o, 298 (i953).
[Vol. 83 :1038121 4
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Court's opinion contains two ambiguities which provided the
means for avoiding the obstacle.16 One is that the Court's men-
tion of the due process clause (quoted above) can be read to
mean that although a due process claim is generally a valid in-
quiry, the alleged errors in this case did not amount to a denial
of due process. The other is the use of the "lawful powers"
terminology, which could be interpreted as an authorization to
reach many issues of fundamental fairness, as long as the habeas
court stayed within the rubric of "jurisdiction." "
In Burns v. Wilson 38 the Court attempted to clarify the
.Hiatt opinion. The court-martialed petitioners alleged on habeas
a denial of due process. 9  The district court 4o dismissed the
petitions on the ground that it had no authority to look into
such an allegation. The circuit court 4' affirmed, while ruling
that the expanding scope of review in civilian cases dictated that
Hiatt not be read to bar all review of constitutional issues. That
court stated that habeas would lie only "in the exceptional case
when a denial of a constitutional right is so flagrant as to affect
the 'jurisdiction' (i.e., the basic power) of the tribunal." 42 After
a lengthy consideration of the allegations on their merits, the
circuit court held that the test was not met.
The Supreme Court affirmed, but was unable to come to any
agreement as to what issues were cognizable. At least seven Jus-
tices 43 appeared to reject the old view, expressed in Mr. Justice
Minton's concurring opinion,44 that civilian courts on habeas
could only review the formal jurisdiction of the military court.45
Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion announced that a civilian
"
8See Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 339, 341 (D.C. Cir. '952), aff'd sub nom.
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (953).
37 The Supreme Court added to the confusion later in the year when it de-
clared, without citing Hiatt, that denial of the opportunity to raise the issue of
insanity goes to the question of jurisdiction. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S.
122, 124 (I95O) (dictum).
38346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
28 The petitioners had been sentenced to death for rape and murder. They
alleged that they had been illegally detained, their confessions coerced, their right
to counsel denied, evidence suppressed, perjured testimony procured, and that the
trial atmosphere had been conducive to mob violence. The dispute on these claims
was chiefly centered on issues of fact, not on the applicable legal standards.
40 Burns v. Lovett, 104 F. Supp. 312 (D.D.C. 1952); Dennis v. Lovett, 104
F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1952).
4 Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
42 Id. at 342.
43 Mr. Justice Jackson concurred in the result, without opinion. 346 U.S. at
146.
44346 U.S. X37, 146.
42 Lower courts now consider this concept as finally laid to rest. E.g., Gibbs
v. Blackwell, 354 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. i965).
1215
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habeas court could inquire only into those constitutional claims
with which the military had not dealt "fully and fairly" 4 in a
"fair consideration." 17 Applying the rule to the case, he found
that the military had heard petitioners out on every significant
allegation, then had scrutinized the trial record, and in lengthy
opinions had concluded that petitioners had failed to establish
their allegations. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented,48 arguing that,
as in review of state convictions, 49 any denial of due process en-
titled the petitioners to habeas relief. He would have had the
habeas court determine at least whether the military court had
employed the proper legal standard, even if bowing to the mili-
tary court's findings of fact.50
2. The Range of Issues Cognizable. - (a) Constitutional Is-
sues. - Since Burns, the Supreme Court has remained virtually
silent "' on the range of issues cognizable when a federal habeas
court entertains a petition from a court-martialed prisoner.
Consequently, the lower courts have had to struggle on their
own with the "fair consideration" test, at least with respect
to constitutional issues. 2 The fair consideration test poses few
unusual problems when applied to questions of fact. Under
now familiar principles, 3 if the military court has held a hear-
ing at which the defendant had an opportunity to develop the
facts, if the procedures surrounding that hearing were conducive
to a full development, and if the findings are stated or can easily
46 346 U.S. at 142.
47 Id. at 144.
48 Id. at I50.
49 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
50 Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion, 346 U.S. at 148, which
was reiterated and expanded upon denial of rehearing, 346 U.S. at 844. He argued
that inadequate exploration of the issues and the inconclusive determination called
for a better focused reargument and more careful deliberation.
" The Court said it was following Burns in Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S.
583 (1957), where it refused to review the severity of a military sentence which
was within the statutory maximum. The case did little to clarify Burns since even
a state prisoner under Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), probably could not
attack such a sentence. See p. 1070 supra. The reliance on Fowler in Williams v.
Heritage, 323 F.2d 731, 732 (5th Cir. x963), cerL. denied, 377 U.S. 945 (1964), as
indicating a return to the pre-Burns view of the scope of military habeas, is then
unwarranted.
The other mentions of Burns have been equally unilluminating. See United
States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 350 n.3, 351 (1969); Morse v. Boswell, 393
U.S. 802, 809 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting to mem. denial of application for
stay), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1052 (1969) ; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 n.68, 56
(1957).
52 Treatment of jurisdictional and other legal issues on habeas is discussed at
pp. 1227-29 infra.
63 See pp. X113-40 supra.
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be reconstructed, the military can be said to have fairly consid-
ered the issue.54 Professor Bator has noted in a similar context
the fruitlessness of a search for the "ultimate truth" of the his-
torical sequence of events.55 These principles are nearly as ap-
plicable to fair military court findings of fact as to fair state court
findings. Military findings, particularly those not reviewed by a
military appeals court, might warrant less deference than state
findings, however, because of the special role of the court-martial
in meting out discipline. 5 But the federal habeas courts seem to
defer, in general, very readily to military findings of fact.5 7
The courts have had a harder time in applying the fair con-
sideration test to issues of law. Taken at its face, the test re-
quires a federal habeas court to refrain from reviewing a con-
stitutional decision of a military court that diverges from the
usual constitutional standard and is unjustified by any unique
military interest, if only the military court has used fair and
adequate procedures in coming to its decision. But if the "right-
ness" of the military decision is to be an indicium of the "fair-
ness" of the consideration, then there is no logical way to prevent
the fair consideration test from turning into a review de novo.
Faced with such difficulties,58 the courts have tried various solu-
tions. 9 Some courts, admitting confusion, manage to avoid the
issue by finding no constitutional violation, whatever the proper
standard of review.60 Other courts have reviewed issues of con-
stitutional law de novo, either by virtually ignoring Burns and
ruling that such claims are cognizable,6 ' or, more cautiously, by
" Burns itself demonstrated this principle in its treatment of the factual issues
presented. See pp. 1225-26 infra.
1 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prison-
ers, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441, 447 (1963).
" Cf. p. 1224 infra. On the other hand, where unraveling the fact situation
requires significant experience with the realities of military life, deference to facts
found by a fair procedure would be appropriate.
'7 See, e.g., Kasey v. Goodwyn, 291 F.2d 174 (4 th Cir. g6i), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 959 (1962); Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365 (gth Cir. 1955) (per curiam).
" The existence of such difficulties may argue that Burns was intended to apply
only to issues of fact. See pp. 1225-26 infra.
" See generally Katz & Nelson, supra note 5, at 2o6-ii.
'
0E.g., Kasey v. Goodwyn, 291 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir. ig6i), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 959 (1962) ; Bisson v. Howard, 224 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 916 (1955).
" E.g., White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d 503 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 9oo
(1954) (while all but ignoring Burns, the court quotes United States ex rel. Innes
v. Hiatt, I4x F.2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944); see p. X213 supra); Harris v. Cic-
cone, 29o F. Supp. 729, 733 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
Perhaps the most striking example of this approach, and the only time that the
decision resulted in the release of the petitioner from confinement, was In re
Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah z965). The government, however, chose not
to appeal.
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ruling that a determination of the fairness of consideration in-
volves inquiry into the rightness of the decision. 2 The majority
of courts, however, have taken a narrow view of their power to
review on habeas corpus a decision of a court-martial, and apply,
in effect, a simple test: did the military consider the allegation?
If so, the military determination is conclusive: 03
[T]he Burns decision . . . does no more than hold that a mili-
tary court must consider questions relating to the guarantees af-
forded an accused by the Constitution and when this is done, the
civil courts will not review its action.
These courts, in other words, refuse to consider de novo any
issue on which the military has made a decision.
The deference granted to military courts under the prevalent
interpretation of Burns is far greater than the deference to state
courts under Brown v. Allen.64 When considering a habeas peti-
tion from a state prisoner, the federal court can inquire de novo
into questions of constitutional law and can repeat the process
of applying the law to the facts, no matter how fully the state
court has considered the issue and no matter how adequate the
state procedures." If the state inadequately considered issues of
fact, the federal habeas court can redetermine them. 60 But Burns
has been read to prohibit inquiry into law or fact if the military
has decided the issue. This result is a strange one, for there are
several reasons the state courts would seem to deserve more, not
less, deference than military courts from the federal judiciary.
First, since the military is a federal creation, the federal courts
when reviewing a court-martial conviction need not feel restrained
by notions of comity based on federalism. Second, state courts
are part of the scheme established by the Constitution to provide
for ifhterpretation of constitutional standards; thus their decisions
on constitutional issues, having once survived the scrutiny of di-
rect review, should be entitled to greater durability than the
62 Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D. Kan. 1959):
[1]f a careful examination of the record compels a conclusion . . . that
basic constitutional rights were violated, it would seem that a civil court
would have jurisdiction to grant relief because under such circumstances it
cannot be said that the reviewing military authorities fairly considered these
questions.
See also Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F.2d 633, 641 (5th Cir. 1959) (dictum), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 914 (196o).
" Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483, 487 (ioth Cir. 1993). See also Mitchell v.
Swope, 224 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. x955) (per curiam) ; Bourchier v. Van Metre,
223 F.2d 646, 648 (D.C. Cir. i955); Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760, 761, 763 (loth
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 903 (954); Swisher v. United States, 237 F. Supp.
921, 928-29 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (dictum), aff'd, 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966).
64344 U.S. 443 (i953).
6 See pp. IO56-57 supra.
66 See pp. 1118-4o supra.
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decisions of military courts entirely outside this constitutional
scheme.67 Third, state convictions can be reviewed in the Su-
preme Court for constitutional infirmities, 8 while military con-
victions have never been subject to direct review by civilian
courts 9 Since habeas corpus is the only important means of
civilian review, 70 a narrow range of issues cognizable would be
67 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his separate opinioni upon denial of rehearing in
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 851 (i953), noted the anomaly that "a conviction
by a constitutional court which lacked due process is open to attack by habeas
corpus while an identically defective conviction when rendered by an ad hoc
military tribunal is invulnerable."
08 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (x964).
60 See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82 (i858).
70 See generally United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 350 n.3 (1969) (dic-
tum), rev'g 377 F.2d 586, 592 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ; Barker, Military Law-A Separate
System of Jurisprudence, 36 U. CiN. L. Rxv. 223, 231-32 (1967). Other means of
civilian review have been successively declared unavailable: certiorari from the
Supreme Court in Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (i Wall.) 243 (1863); declara-
tory judgments in Brown v. Royall, 8I F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd, (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 13, 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 952 (1950); relief under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act in id.; see 5 U.S.C. §§ iooi(a), 1004 (x964). Once a
court-martial's jurisdiction is established neither a writ of prohibition, Smith v.
Whitney, 1i6 U.S. 167, 177 (1886), nor mandamus to the court-martial, United
States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326, 335-36 (1922), lies; equitable relief
is also then barred, Carter v. Woodring, 92 F.2d 544, 546 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 752 (1937).
Other collateral remedies, which do not require custody, may be available, but
their validity is questionable and their scope of review is tied to that allowed on
habeas. The most important is a suit for damages which result from the invalid
court-martial sentence. See notes 4 & 24 supra. The suit is now against the
United States in the Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964), or, presumably, in
the district courts if the amount in controversy does not exceed $io,ooo, id. §
1346(a) (2). Dicta in a recent Supreme Court case, United States v. Augenblick,
393 U.S. 348, 350-5, (1969), indicate this remedy may be improper because of the
finality provisions of UCMJ article 76. Even if available, the remedy is coter-
minous with habeas, see, e.g., Augenblick v. United States, 377 F.2d 586, 592-93
(Ct. Cl. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 348 (x969); Begalke v. United
States, 286 F.2d 6o6, 6o8 (Ct. Cl. 196o).
Despite prior cases mentioned above, a declaratory judgment, 28 U.S.C. §§
2201-02 (1964), may be available today to attack a court-martial conviction, see
Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301, 303-04 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 US. 881
(1966) (declaratory relief available to challenge the constitutionality of a UCMJ
provision; relief denied on merits)'; Jackson v. Wilson, 147 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C.
1957) (declaratory relief available to vacate court-martial judgment without juris-
diction; relief denied on merits). But this relief might be barred by the finality
provision of the UCMJ, see United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 351 (1969)
(dictum); Davies v. McNamara, 275 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D.N.H. 1967), aff'd sub
norn. Davies v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496 (ist Cir. i968). Even if available, the
remedy is surely limited to the issues which can be raised on habeas corpus.
Goldstein v. Johnson, 184 F.2d 342, 343 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879
(1950). A third possible collateral remedy is review by mandamus of a refusal
by the secretary of a military department to grant administrative relief. Prob-
lems with this device are discussed at p. 1237 infra.
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more telling in insulating constitutional abuse from correction
than a comparable restriction of habeas review of state convic-
tions. Finally, the practical necessity of supervising the applica-
tion of the Constitution in state criminal systems may be less
than in the military system. Relatively speaking, "[a] civilian
trial . . . is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection
of individual rights, while the military trial is marked by the
age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice." 71
What, then, is the justification for treating military judgments
on federal constitutional questions with more respect than state
judgments? No statute or constitutional provision compels the
federal courts to make the range of issues narrower when a mili-
tary detention is attacked than when a civilian custody is chal-
lenged. - The same federal statute grants the district courts
power to issue habeas to military and civilian prisoners,1 3 and
there has never been any special treatment statutorily given to
military prisoners.74 The range of issues cognizable on military
habeas, as the Burns Court recognized, is a matter of policy, not
of power.
Chief Justice Vinson offered several arguments in his opinion
to justify a narrow range of issues cognizable for military habeas
corpus. First, he argued that "in military habeas corpus . . .
the scope of matters open for review . . . has always been more
narrow than in civil cases." 76 Only Hiatt v. Brown,'7 7 decided
three years earlier, was cited. Yet the original range of inquiry
fixed by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Reed was at least as
broad as that applied to civilian cases of that time. 78  Subse-
quently, there was a gradual expansion of this range roughly
comparable to the expansion of civilian habeas corpus.7 The
revolutionary expansion of civilian habeas corpus after Johnson
v. Zerbst 80 was also paralleled in military habeas until the Court
' O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (x969) (footnote omitted). See
also p. 1224 infra.
72 Note, Civilian Court Review of Court Martial Adjudications, 69 COLUm.
L. REv. 1259, 1273-74 (I969).
73 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (x964).
7 4 The finality provision of UCMJ art. 76 (and formerly Article of War 5o(h)
of 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 637-38) does not apply to habeas corpus. See p. 1222
infra.
7' Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (x953) (Vinson, CJ., plurality opinion).
See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 30 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("The ultimate
nature and scope of the writ of habeas corpus are within the discretion of the
judiciary unless validly circumscribed by Congress.").
76 346 U.S. at 139.
7 339 U.S. 103 (950).
7 8 See pp. 1209-10 supra.
7' Katz & Nelson, supra note 5, at 197-98.
so 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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reacted in Hiatt.8' Thus it was only in 1950 - the year in which
Vinson's historical survey began and ended - that the range of
issues cognizable on civilian habeas corpus became significantly
broader than the range on military habeas. Second, the Chief
Justice pointed out that the need for habeas was not pressing
because Congress was doing a good job of enforcing fairness in
the military courts.8 2 But the very premise of the Burns and
other decisions is that a serviceman is constitutionally protected,
just as a civilian, against unlawful or arbitrary government ac-
tion. 3 Congressional action does not reduce the obligation of the
courts to define and protect those rights.84 The statutes that
protect servicemen could, of course, be altered at any time8 5 Nor
does the third point 8 made in the opinion justify a narrow range
8, See pp. 1213-14 supra.
12 The Uniform Code of Military Justice in 195, made great advances in as-
suring court-martial defendants fair process and an extensive system of review.
See Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARV.
L. REv. 266, 294-95, 300 (1958); Barker, Military Law-A Separate System of
Jurisprudence, 36 U. CN. L. REV. 223, 228-29 (1967). With regard to continuing
congressional effort in these matters, see Mounts & Sugarman, The Military Justice
Act of x968, 55 A.B.A.J. 470 (x969).
83346 U.S. at 142-43:
For the constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful enough, and
sufficiently adaptable, to protect soldiers - as well as civilians - from the
crude injustices of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing guilt
by dispensing with rudimentary fairness rather than finding truth through
adherence to those basic guarantees which have long been recognized and
honored by the military courts as well as the civil courts.
It may be that the original intent of the framers was not to apply the Bill -of
Rights per se to the military, but rather to leave to Congress the task of safe-
guarding the soldiers' rights to that extent which is consonant with the demands
of discipline and duty. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original
Practice (pts. 1-2), 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 266 (1958). Contra, Henderson, Courts-
Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293
(I957); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 152-53 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
However, considerations of original intent have been rendered largely academic by
the recent, express application of the Constitution to servicemen. This has been
accomplished either by a direct application of the constitutional amendments or by
an application of the substance of these rights through fifth amendment due pro-
cess. See Wiener, supra, at 294-304. The first course has been followed by the
United States Court of Military Appeals. United States v. Jacoby, ii U.S.C.M.A.
428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (i96o) (dictum) (Bill of Rights applicable
to servicemen unless expressly or by necessary implication unavailable) ; see United
States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 216-17, 219, 33 C.M.R. 411, 428-29, 431 (1963)
(Quinn, C.J., and Ferguson, J., concurring opinions) (right to counsel). The latter
course was adopted by the Supreme Court in Burns. The district court deciding
In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965), utilized both, applying fifth
amendment due process and sixth amendment right to counsel in an overlapping
manner; see note 61 supra.
84 Cf. H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 323-24, 333-35 (I953).
8" Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 & n.67 (1957) (Black, J., plurality opinion).
86346 U.S. at 142:
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of issues cognizable on military habeas: the finality provision of
UCMJ article 76 87 was simply not intended by Congress to apply
to habeas. 88 A fourth argument was that "[m]ilitary law, like
state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart," as
shown by the fact that the "Court has played no role in its de-
velopment." 89 While military courts and the law they administer
have enjoyed a long development largely independent of the civil-
ian judiciary in England and America, 90 the Chief Justice ignored
the fact that the rules governing a court-martial's proceedings are
required by statute 91 to conform as nearly as practicable to those
principles of law and rules of evidence recognized by the federal
courts. Furthermore, Chief Justice Vinson slighted the moral
pressures, indirect but very real, created by the Supreme Court's
pronouncements; judges of the military courts apparently feel
bound by the Court's rulings where military necessities permit, 2
and cite the Court continually. 3 Also, as has been shown, the
federal courts in the past have often stepped in by habeas to
prevent the military courts from exceeding their appropriate juris-
diction, to force conformity with their governing statutes, or even
occasionally to correct radical departures from fundamental fair-
ness. In short, the Chief Justice's view of history was over-
simplified. Additionally, and more fundamentally, the historical
separateness of military law is irrelevant where constitutional law
is the issue.
We have held before that [the statutory finality provision] does not dis-
place the civil courts' jurisdiction over an application for habeas corpus from
the military prisoner. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (ig5o). But these
provisions do mean that when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly
with an allegation raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil
court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence.
87 This finality provision, formerly Article of War 5o(h) of 1948, ch. 625, 62
Stat. 637-38, states that decisions of courts-martial are "final and conclusive" and
"binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States."
" H.R. REP. No. 491, 8ist Cong., ist Sess. 35 (1949); S. REP. No. 486, 8Ist
Cong., ist Sess. 32 (I949). Courts have often interpreted article 76 as inapplicable
to habeas. E.g., United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 349-50 (1969) (dic-
tum); Davies v. McNamara, 275 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D.N.H. 1967) (dictum),
aff'd sub nora. Davies v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496 (ist Cir. 1968); United States v.
Frischholz, i6 U.S.C.M.A. r5o, I51, 36 C.M.R. 306, 307 (1966) (dictum). See
also Katz & Nelson, supra note 5, at 213; Pksley, The Federal Courts Look at the
Court-Martial, 12 U. PIr. L. REv. 7, 33-34 (195o); Quinn, The United States
Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 225,
228 n.9 (I96i).
s9 346 U.S. at 140.
90See generally I W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW 4-51 (1886); Wurfel, Military
Habeas Corpus, 49 Mic. L. REV. 493, 493-502 (1951).
9 UCMJ art. 36.
92 United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 635, 37 C.M.R. 249, 255 (1967);
Brosman, The Court: Freer Than Most, 6 VAND. L. RFv. 166, x67 (1953).
9 E.g., United States v. Simpson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 34 C.M.R. 464 (1964).
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The main argument on which Burns rested was the special
need of the military "to meet certain overriding demands of dis-
cipline and duty" 94 in order to accomplish its task of defending
the nation. The argument is that this need for discipline requires
that Congress, through the military courts, be allowed to decide
how to deal with servicemen that violate military law. If accu-
rate, this argument could provide a reason for a narrow range of
issues cognizable upon habeas corpus. But the argument is un-
persuasive.
It is true that an expanding military habeas might require
the military to expend its resources on repeated trials and to
forego the manpower needed at the trial or habeas hearing, thus
impeding the military's functions. 5 Further, the prestige of the
military might be sullied if civilian courts often used habeas
corpus to correct errors made in military courts. But arguments
of this sort have been rejected when made by the states in ob-
jecting to federal habeas.9 6 The interest in vindicating constitu-
tional rights simply overrides such arguments.97 Furthermore,
the primary effect on discipline of any expansion of the "escape
route" that habeas represents will be on the military prison popu-
lation. Quite clearly, the military has no special need of that sort
of discipline which produces a fighting unit for men it is holding
in prison. The primary effect is limited to prisoners because ha-
beas is not of immediate concern to soldiers outside the stockade.
For this mass of servicemen, the ordinary, day-to-day enforce-
ment of discipline does not depend on the court-martial, but on
extra duty, withholding of passes, and non-judicial punishment, 8
normally considered beyond the reach of habeas. As to morale,
the psychological disruption incident to expanding habeas to
the full review enjoyed by civilian prisoners can be expected to
be minimal since the advances in court-martial fairness already
made by Congress and the USCMA have greatly reduced the
magnitude of change necessary to this expansion. In fact, if any
appreciable effect on morale is felt, it might be a positive one
stemming from the added protection of constitutional rights that
is afforded by habeas, just as confidence in the system of military
94346 U.S. at 140.
"The Air Force has complained that civilian trials often keep military wit-
nesses frozen in one place for long periods. Joint Hearings on S. 745 et al. Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and
a Special Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
ios8 (x966).
" See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 488 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
"
7 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
" UCMJ art. 15.
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law supposedly grew following implementation of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice."
The special needs argument, then, must be aimed not at
limiting the range of issues cognizable on habeas but rather at
establishing the military's need to determine for itself the sub-
stantive constitutional rights servicemen have. Such arguments
center on the need for certainty of punishment, especially when
extreme circumstances necessitate disregard for civilian notions
of individual rights, and on the peculiar nature of the military
environment, which requires the expertise of military judges for
a proper balance of military needs against constitutional rights.
That is, the special needs argument here reduces to an assertion
about which set of courts is to make the final judgment on con-
stitutional questions. The fair consideration test of Burns permits
the military to create its own version of constitutional law, with-
out any review to ensure a valid military justification for the
difference. Giving the military courts this power is likely to
undermine the basic premise that servicemen are protected by the
Constitution against government activity violative of their con-
stitutional rights. 10
The same sorts of considerations that justify federal habeas
review of the constitutional validity of a state conviction 101 apply
with even greater force to review of military convictions. The
court-martial is an ad hoc tribunal and is subject to the risks of
command influence since military judges lack the constitutional
guarantee of life tenure and protected salary. It is not "an inde-
pendent instrument of justice but . . . to a significant degree a
specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military dis-
cipline is preserved." 102 The momentum of the court-martial's
interest in guilt or innocence and its institutional ineptitude in
"dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law" 103 both
argue that a second proceeding is necessary to ensure that the
defendant's constitutional rights are respected. That second pro-
ceeding should be in an article III court, not in a military appeals
court. Even more than a state court, the military tribunal has
dual allegiances: -its institutional role must make it highly re-
sponsive to arguments based on the special needs of the mili-
tary.'0 4 The federal habeas court in a proceeding which looks
only at constitutional questions, not guilt or innocence, will be
institutionally more hospitable to the serviceman's rights.
09 ig6o ANNuAL REPORT OF THE USCMA 4-5.1 0 See note 83 supra.
101 See pp. 1056-62 supra.
102 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
103 Id.
104 Cf. pp. 1057-62 supra.
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Moreover, the habeas court need not apply the full panoply
of constitutional provisions as they apply to civilians. The court
can take real military needs into consideration when determining
the scope of a serviceman's constitutional rights if necessary to
avoid a foreseeable adverse effect on the military's mission. To
this end, the habeas court can consider the opinions of the military
courts, and rules of exhaustion can ensure that the habeas court
will have before it the military's statement of its interests."°5
The degree of deference given these opinions can be expected to
vary according to the authoritativeness of the source within the
military judicial hierarchy and according to the persuasiveness of
the argument. Particularly careful consideration of the military
opinion can be given by the habeas court on those mixed issues
of fact and law which call for military expertise. For example,
the military's determination of the meaning of illegal search in
the military environment should receive more weight than its
interpretation of the right to counsel before courts-martial.
These arguments lead to the conclusion that there is no per-
suasive reason for a narrower range of issues cognizable when a
military prisoner petitions for habeas than when a state prisoner
petitions. The proper rule would seem to be that the federal
habeas court can decide whether the military court used the
proper constitutional standard and whether that standard was
correctly applied to the facts.'0 6 The habeas court should nor-
mally defer to the findings of fact of the military court, provided
they were arrived at after a "fair consideration." 107 In short, the
Burns rule as interpreted by a majority of courts should be re-
jected, and the rules of habeas which govern habeas petitions by
state prisoners should govern petitions by military prisoners. 08
Special military needs can be taken into account by the civilian
court in deciding the substance of the constitutional provisions
which apply.
It is possible to interpret Burns to allow this rule, although
the language and spirit of the opinion do seem to support the
traditional interpretation. One can read Burns as requiring defer-
ence only to the military court's findings of fact. The case itself
involved primarily disputed questions of fact: whether or not
the alleged acts of coercion of confession, detention, "planted"
'
0 See pp. 1232-33 infra.
'
06 See p. 1o56 supra.
'
07 See pp. iiiS-2i supra.
'0'The alternative solution of providing for direct review by certiorari from
the Supreme Court to the USCMA is unsatisfactory for the same reasons that
habeas is a necessary complement to certiorari to the states, i.e., the present volume
of the Court's work load. See p. io6i supra.
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evidence, and denial of counsel actually occurred. 0 9 Chief Jus-
tice Vinson was apparently thinking solely of factual issues when
he ruled that the habeas court should not "re-examine and re-
weigh each item of evidence of the occurrence of events which
tend to prove or disprove one of the allegations" 110 and should
not cater to the petitioners' desire "to make a new record, to
prove de novo in the District Court precisely the case which they
failed to prove in the military courts." "I Only one pure legal
issue was posed in Burns: a contention that the rule of McNabb
v. United States 112 rendered the confession inadmissable. The
Chief Justice handled the problem de novo although the military
courts had evidently fully and fairly considered the issue."3 Thus,
as a few courts have hesitatingly indicated," 4 Burns can be read
to allow full consideration of legal issues by the habeas court, with
deference only to the military's findings of fact.
In the face of considerable lower court precedent for a broad-
er interpretation of Burns, however, this view is unlikely to pre-
vail, and only a re-examination of Burns by the Supreme Court
is likely to settle the issue.:"5
109 See note 39 supra.
110346 U.S. at 144.
... Id. at 146.
12318 U.S. 332 (i943).
113 346 U.S. at 145 n.12. Relegating this issue to a footnote in Burns is perhaps
further indication that treatment of issues of constitutional law was tangential to
the Chief Justice's reasoning.
"14E.g., Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339, 342 (xoth Cir. 1967) (The
court considered de novo the legal issue of right to counsel in a given fact situa-
tion, after observing that if "the constitutional issue [had] involve[d] a factual
determination, our inquiry [would be] limited to whether the military court gave
full and fair consideration to the constitutional questions presented."); Gibbs v.
Blackwell, 354 F.2d 469, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1965) (semble). But see Smith v. Mc-
Namara, 395 F.2d 896, 900 (ioth Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969),
where the same judge who decided Kennedy held in a mandamus proceeding that
a non-factual issue of constitutional law was not cognizable since the military
heard it "fully and fairly"; Kennedy was cited as support.
The Court of Claims has adopted a scope of review of courts-martial similar
to the one suggested in text. E.g., Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949, 954 (Ct.
CI. 2966) (Had the issue turned on evaluation of particular facts, the court would
not have reassessed them, once the military had done so with care, but "such
abstinence is not to be practiced when thd servicemen presents pure issues of con-
stitutional law . . . . That type of unmixed legal question this court has always
decided for itself."); Augenblick v. United States, 377 F.2d 586, 593 (Ct. Cl.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
... The Supreme Court bypassed an opportunity to clarify the whole area of
collateral attack on military judgments when it decided United States v. Augen-
blick, 393 U.S. 348 (I969), reversing on the merits two Court of Claims cases
without passing on the validity of the Deming approach to collateral attack used
in one case (Juhl v. United States, 383 F.2d oo9 (1967), see note 20 supra &
pp. 1227-28 infra) or a straight-forward constitutional inquiry similar to the one
[V01. 83 :10381226
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(b) Questions of Nonconstitutional Law.- The statute that
grants habeas jurisdiction to the federal courts with respect to
both state prisoners and military prisoners provides that the peti-
tioner is to be released if held "in violation of the Constitution
or laws" of the United States.116 State prisoners rarely have such
claims,"' but since all military law is federal law, every legal
issue faced by the court-martial would seem open to review on
habeas under the statute.
It is clear that the question of jurisdiction of the person and
the subject matter- a question of law-is open to review de
novo on habeas corpus." 8 But it is not clear whether other ques-
tions of law are cognizable. Under the approach of McClaughry
v. Deming 11 statutory violations can be raised on habeas under
the rubric of jurisdiction, since any act by the court-martial be-
yond or inconsistent with its governing statutes can be said to be
void. Deming, however, was decided long before Burns v. Wilson.
Today Deming seems an outmoded approach. It arose to enable
courts to reach questions bearing on fundamental fairness which
were then not otherwise reviewable. Since that time a complex
military appeals system has arisen to provide initial review. 20
Moreover, the Constitution has been held to apply directly to
servicemen,12 and Burns permits some review of constitutional
suggested in text, which was used in the other case (Augenblick v. United States,
377 F.2d 586 (1967)).
Congressional action might also clarify the problem, but it seems unlikely to
be forthcoming as a practical matter. Congress' last dealing with habeas was the
defeat of a 1968 proposal, which was reported out of committe, to eliminate federal
habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners. See S. REP. No. 1097, 9oth Cong., 2d Sess.
xo, 63-66 (1968). See also Note, Title H1 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of z968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1392-93 & n4 (1969).
l1 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)'(3) (1964) (emphasis added).
'17 See pp. 1070-72 supra.
118 In a recent series of jurisdiction cases the Supreme Court has not bowed to
the fair consideration given the issue by the USCMA. McElroy v. United States
ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (196o), overruling United States v. Wilson, 9
U.S.C.M.A. 6o, 25 C.M.R. 322 (1958) (personal jurisdiction of courts-martial
over civilian employees of the military) ; Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,
361 U.S. 234 (i96o), overruling United States v. Dial, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 541, 26 C.M.R.
321 (958) (personal jurisdiction over civilian dependents); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1954), overruling United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R.
314 (954) (jurisdiction over capital crimes committed by civilian dependents).
See Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. II, 20-21 (1921).
11) x86 U.S. 49 (1902); see pp. 1211-12 supra.
120 At the time of Deming the only review was confirmation by a superior
officer or, in important cases, by the President. Rev. Stat. tit. XIV, ch. 5, § 1342,
arts. 1o4-IO (1874). The appeal system currently used is described in note i68
infra.
121 See note 83 supra.
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issues.'22 Consequently, the raison d'etre of Deming has disap-
peared. The opinion of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Augenblick 123 suggests 124 that if the Deming approach relied on
by the lower court 125 retains any validity at all, it is limited to
violations of law that take on constitutional stature.120 For legal
issues of a nonconstitutional and nonjurisdictional nature the
lower courts must look to Burns.
Since Burns has been interpreted by most to mean that a fed-
eral habeas court can not review a constitutional decision of a
military court if that court has considered the matter fully and
fairly, it would seem to follow that where the military court has
interpreted a provision of military law in a full and fair proceed-
ing, the habeas court cannot review the decision. On the other
hand, where the military courts have not considered the issue, and
the petitioner has not waived his claim,'27 the federal courts on
habeas conceivably could consider the issue de novo. The Su-
preme Court in Jackson v. Taylor,128 without mentioning the
problem, considered an issue in the interpretation of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice which the USCMA had not faced. 20
Yet even the power to review when the military has not consid-
ered the claim may be in doubt, for several recent cases use broad
language indicating that only jurisdictional and constitutional
issues are ever cognizable.130
In short, while the state of the law is somewhat unclear, it
seems that there is a general tendency to limit civilian review of
legal issues (other than jurisdiction) even more narrowly than
Burns has been read to limit review of constitutional issues. How-
"
2 See pp. 215-16 supra.
123 393 U.S. 348 (1969). The case involved review of collateral attacks by way
of suits for damages in the Court of Claims; such review has been traditionally
comparable to habeas. See note 7o supra.
124 The exact holding of the case is unclear because the Court failed to consider
explicitly the lower court's arguments based on the Deming approach. See Note,
supra note 72, at 1272; note 15 supra.
12' Juhl v. United States, 383 F.2d ioo9 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
121 In this case, the improper use of accomplice testimony in violation of MCM
(i95I) ff I53(a), was ruled not to be of constitutional stature.127 See pp. 1230-32 infra.
128353 U.S. 569 ('957).
120 Id. at 571-72. The issue was the power of the Board of Review to modify
a court-martial sentence under UCMJ art. 66(c). In Fischer v. Ruffner, 277 F.2d
756, 758 (sth Cir. Ig6o), Jackson was distinguished by considering this issue to
be one of jurisdiction.
"2o Wigand v. Taylor, 285 F.2d 594 (ioth Cir. i96o) (denying review of an
alleged violation of a procedural regulation, MCM (I95i) ff 30(f)); Fischer v.
Ruffner, 277 F.2d 756 (5th Cir, ig6o) (question of law involving the statute of
limitations ruled not cognizable on habeas); Bourchier v. Van Metre, 223 F.2d
646 (D.C. Cir. I955) (semble) (only constitutional and jurisdictional issues are
cognizable).
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ever, the kind of objection raised above - that Burns permits the
development by the military of its own constitutional law 131 _
does not apply with the same force to issues of military law as it
does to constitutional questions. The appeals system in the mili-
tary can usually ensure that the court-martial did not violate its
governing statutes and can provide for uniform application of
military law. While military courts may be institutionally inade-
quate to make unreviewable judgments of a person's constitutional
rights, 32 other issues of law are of a lower stature and within
the competence of the military court, which deals with such issues
each day. An analogy may be drawn from review of state con-
victions on habeas. Matters of state law will not be heard by
the federal court; they are exclusively for the state judicial sys-
tem.33 Just as the federal courts will not become involved in is-
sues of state law because of the sovereignty of the state, matters
of military law as a regular course could be left to the system
Congress created to enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The state of the law on the cognizability of nonconstitutional
legal issues which have been decided by the military is thus ac-
ceptable. However, in the case where the military has not heard
the claim, a tendency to bar all issues of military law on habeas
is more disquieting. On such a petition, the habeas court should
apply a strict exhaustion doctrine; 131 but if there is no possi-
bility of airing the claim in the military and if the claim has not
been waived, the federal court should provide relief by exercising
its reserve power to review matters arising under the laws of the
United States.
3. Traditional Habeas Doctrines and Review of Court-Martial
Decisions. - Since habeas corpus petitions from prisoners under
the sentence of a court-martial are brought into federal court
under the same statutory provisions as petitions from state pris-
oners, 135 the court-martialed prisoner faces the same obstacles to
relief as the state prisoner. Custody is one example. 136 Present
case law requires that the court-martialed prisoner be in actual
physical confinement before habeas will lie.' 37 This is the tradi-
131 See p. 1224 supra.
132 See id.
133 See pp. 1070-72 supra.
"" See PP. 1232-34 infra.
13328 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964).
130 Other obstacles include prematurity, exhaustion of remedies, and waiver.
" See, e.g., Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 570-75 (1885) (order to remain
in District of Columbia is not sufficient confinement); Kanewske v. Nitze, 383
F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (bad-conduct discharge does not satisfy
custody requirement); Goldstein v. Johnson, 184 F.2d 342, 343 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879 (I95O) (dishonorable discharge does not satisfy
custody requirement)'; Murray v. Wedemeyer, i79 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.) (per
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tional rule.138 As the custody requirement loosens for state and
federal prisoners,'139 the strict requirement for court-martialed
prisoners can be expected to ease, 14 0 because the same purposes
are served by the custody rule in both situations.' 4 ' Likewise, as
the Great Writ begins to provide civilian prisoners with remedies
beyond simple release from custody, 4 2 the present rule that phys-
ical release is the only remedy available to a court-martialed
prisoner 113 should be modified.
In two areas, however, the courts face problems in applying
the usual habeas doctrines. The first is waiver, where a combina-
tion of the language in Burns v. Wilson ' and a lack of authori-
tative application of Fay v. Noia 14 has created the problem.
Exhaustion of remedies is the second area; there the proliferation
of intra-military procedures makes application of the well-under-
stood rules somewhat complicated.
(a) Waiver. - During the period that the habeas court could
inquire only into jurisdiction when petitioned by a court-martialed
prisoner,' 6 the waiver issue was rarely litigated. 47  Now that
constitutional claims are cognizable, however, the courts are regu-
larly faced with the waiver question.4 8
Burns v. Wilson, the first case in which the Supreme Court
recognized a constitutional claim from a court-martialed prisoner
curiam), cert. denied, $39 U.S. 980 (I95O) (appeal of habeas corpus judgment
dismissed when appellant was paroled).
" See pp. 1073-74 supra. '
" E.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (i968); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S.
54 (i968); Jones.v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). An analogous loosening is
occurring for those aggrieved by military administrative decisions. E.g.; Ham-
mond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 710-12 (2d Cir. 1968) (order received by reservist
to report to active duty is sufficient custody); In re Phillips, 167 F. Supp. 139,
141 (S.D. Cal. i958) (active duty is sufficient custody); see pp. 1252-59 infra.
4P There have already occurred some signs of this easing with respect to courts-
martial. E.g., Harris v. Ciccone, 29o F. Supp. 729, 730 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (release
on parole before decision but after filing petition does not preclude relief). But
see Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301, 303 n.7 (D.C. Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 88i (1966); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 280 (ist Cir. 2965)
(dictum). These last two cases indicate that the avoidance of the custody re-
quirement should be accomplished by the use of alternative remedies; see note 70
supra.
241 See pp. 1073-79 supra.
4
" See pp. 1079-87 supra.
143 Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 570 (1885).
144346 US. 137 (953).
145372 U.S. 391 (2963).
146 See pp. 1209-10 supra.147 The language of Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. I, 20 (1922), if broadly read,
suggests that jurisdictional claims cannot be waived.
14 1 See generally pp. 1103-13 supra.
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on habeas, provides no guidance on waiver, for all the claims
there had been asserted before the military courts. Nor has the
Court provided guidance since Burns.'4 9 Lower court decisions
have not been uniform, but the prevailing view of waiver is a
strict one: a claim is said to be barred on habeas corpus if it was
available but not asserted in the military court system.'5 This
rule has been based not so much on principles of waiver as on the
"fair consideration" test of Burns. The Tenth Circuit in Suttles
v. Davis "I' put it this way:
The civil courts may review only claims of infringement of con-
stitutional rights which the military courts refused to give fair
consideration .... Obviously, it cannot be said that they have
refused to fairly consider claims not asserted.
But this semantic ploy is inconclusive,'5 2 for it may just as easily
be said that where the military had not been presented the claim
it did not give it the fair consideration demanded by Burns as a
bar to habeas review. The waiver question is best answered by
assessing the purposes served by the waiver rule.
Just as in review of state criminal detentions, a waiver rule
for court-martialed prisoners should reflect the policy of encour-
aging defendants to make full use of the other procedures avail-
able to them before recourse to habeas corpus. This policy in
turn reflects interests in permitting the state or military judicial
system to correct its own mistakes, to find a non-constitutional
ground on which to base the decision, and to protect the integrity
of its courts by not having claims which might have led to a
149 Cf. Burns v. Harris, 340 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 96o
(i965).
"'E.g., Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760, 763 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
903 (954) ; LeBallister v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Kan. I965) ; Bokoros
v. Kearney, 144 F. Supp. 22X, 228 (E.D. Tex. 1956); Wilson v. Wilkinson, 129
F. Supp. 324, 326 (M.D. Pa. 1955). Contra, e.g., Swisher v. United States, 237
F. Supp. 921, 928 (W.D. Mo. x965) (dictum), aff'd, 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966);
Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F.2d 633, 636-37 (5th Cir. 1959) (semble), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 914 (ig6o).
151 2,5 F.2d 760, 763, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 903 (I954) (citation omitted).
152 Without the Suttles doctrine, however, Burns (as usually interpreted) could
lead to the following difficulty. Suppose two soldiers in separate proceedings raise
claims of coerced confession. In the first, the court-martial, after full argument
and consideration, decides that the proper legal standard is that the confession is
admissible if trustworthy. In the second, the claim is not raised. Each prisoner
seeks federal habeas. The first, under Burns, would presumably get no review of
the issue, since the military had fully considered it. The second presumably would
get full review. Then, unless the second habeas court were bound by the first
court-martial's determination, it would be free to apply a different legal standard
to the second petitioner. The Suttles strict waiver rule avoids such an anomalous
result.
1231
HeinOnline -- 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1231 1969-1970
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
different result brought up only on collateral attack. These rea-
sons lead to use of the Fay v. Noia 113 "deliberate by-pass" rule
in the military as well as the state area. The simplistic test of
Suttles v. Davis, which would bar claims even when the failure
to assert them was due to a "grisly choice," should be rejected.
(b) Exhaustion. -The Supreme Court did not squarely '
face the question of exhaustion as prerequisite to military habeas
corpus until the vastly increased flow of post-World War II peti-
tions I" and the temporary expansion of the range of issues cog-
nizable in the 1940's ' posed the problem sharply. In Gusik v.
Schilder 157 the Court ruled that a habeas petitioner must have
first availed himself of the then new statutory provision for peti-
tion for a new trial 158 before seeking federal habeas corpus. The
Court expressly applied by analogy the rules of exhaustion, both
statutory x'9 and decisional,' applicable to state prisoners.
The exhaustion rule serves similar purposes in both areas. 10'
First, resort to military postconviction remedies might render
habeas corpus unnecessary, thus avoiding needless interjudicial
friction. Second, the doctrine allows military courts to pass on
constitutional questions as well as factual questions first. The
federal habeas court will then have the military's view of its needs
when it considers the questions presented.
Since the purposes of the exhaustion requirement are similar
for both the state and the military prisoner, it seems clear that
the Fay v. Noia 162 rule that relief is not barred when an unex-
hausted remedy is no longer available should apply to review of
courts-martial, even though there has been no authoritative appli-
cation of that rule up to this time." 3 Barring relief when the
153 372 U.S. 391 (963).
5'4 Some earlier cases relied on considerations peculiar to the exhaustion doc-
trine without expressly formulating it. E.g., Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 575
(1885).
155 Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion
of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. Rav. 483, 499 (1969).
'
56 See pp. 1213-15 supra.
157 340 U.S. 128, 131-32 (i95o).
'Article of War 53 of 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 639, as amended, UCMJ art. 73,
io U.S.C. § 873 (Supp. IV, 1969). Presently this article offers the court-martialed
serviceman the possibility of petitioning the Judge Advocate General for a new
trial, on the grounds of newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court, within
two years of the approval of the court-martial sentence by the convening authority.
159 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (x964).
'"
0 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, ii6 (1944); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, II5 (1935).
.
6 See pp. 1093-1103 supra.
162372 U.S. 391, 434-35 (1963).
263 Sherman, supra note 155, at Sox; see, e.g., Bokoros v. Kearney, 144 F. Supp.
221, 228-29 (E.D. Tex. 1956) (alternative holding), (failure to apply for new trial
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remedy is no longer available is a per se waiver rule, serving none
of the purposes of exhaustion. If the object is to encourage use
of the military court system, a proper waiver rule will suffice. 164
It also seems clear that, since exhaustion is a matter of comity
and not one of power,' a flexible treatment of the exhaustion
requirement is appropriate. Indeed, Gusik itself recognized the
futility exception to the exhaustion requirement. 6 ' Where there
is little to be gained by exhaustion and the petitioner may have
to subject himself to additional penalties in order to pursue his
military remedy, exhaustion ought not be required. 61
Present case law establishes the general rule that all direct
review 16 8 within the military system must be exhausted before
federal habeas will lie.'69 This rule poses no analytical problem,
for it is the same rule used in review of state and federal deten-
tions. 7° Difficulties arise, however, in two areas unique to the
military.
within the one year limit without good cause bars habeas corpus). However, the
court in Williams v. Heritage, 323 F.2d 731, 732 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 945 (1964), in a brief and confusing opinion, did state that Fay v. Noia
should apply to a military prisoner.
104 See pp. 1230-32 supra.
"5 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418-20 (x963); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d
705, 714 (2d Cir. 1968).
160340 U.S. at 132-33.
167There has been a recent, analogous liberalization in the treatment given
exhaustion in habeas cases involving military administrative decisions. E.g., Ham-
mond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 712-14 (zd Cir. 1968); Sherman, supra note I55,
at 538-40.
For another example of flexible treatment of exhaustion, see the Supreme Court's
treatment of challenges of jurisdiction over person described in note 169 infra.
'
0 8 UCMJ arts. 59-72, 74-76, io U.S.C. §§ 859-72, 874-76 (1964), as amended,
(Supp. IV, z969). The chain of review is subject to complex permutations which
depend on the rank of accused, the severity of sentence, and the type of court-
martial. As one example of the thoroughness of direct review, a death sentence
is reviewed by the staff judge advocate (art. 61), the convening authority (art.
6o), a Court of Military Review (art. 66), the USCMA (art. 67), and the Presi-
dent (art. 71(a)).
109 Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 693 (1969) (dictum); Gorko v. Commanding
Officer, 314 F.2d 858, 86o (ioth Cir. 1963) ; Osborne v. Swope, 226 F.2d 908, 909
(9th Cir. 1955). MCM (i95I) ff 214(b) provided that "[pirior to the exhaustion
of the remedies of appellate review and petition for new trial . . . resort to ha-
beas corpus . . . is inappropriate and premature." This provision, along with the
rest of the chapter on habeas corpus, was deleted from MCM (1969).
However, in Noyd v. Bond, supra, at 696 n.8, the Court said that exhaustion is
not required when a prisoner challenges the personal jurisdiction of the military.
The Court's theory was that
the expertise of military courts [does not extend] to the consideration of
constitutional claims of the type presented. Moreover, it appeared especially
unfair to require exhaustion of military remedies when the petitioners raised
substantial arguments denying the right of the military to try them at all.
°
7 0 See pp. 1093-1'03 supra.
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(i) United States Court of Military Appeals' Postconviction
Remedies. - Postconviction relief issuing from the USCMA did
not exist at all until 1966."1 Extraordinary relief was first ac-
tually granted in Jones v. Ignatius 172 less than two years ago. In
that case the sentence of a special court-martial was commuted by
the convening authority 73 from six months confinement and a
bad conduct discharge to eleven months confinement. The latter
sentence was in excess of the statutory maximum." 4 After direct
review ' 75 was exhausted, Jones petitioned the USCMA for ha-
beas corpus or appropriate relief. The latter was granted: the
action of the convening authority was set aside and the case
remanded.'76
The existence of military postconviction relief raises some
important questions. First, must the relief be sought whenever
available? The answer can be found by analogy to federal review
of state detentions. State postconviction remedies ordinarily need
not be utilized if the highest state court to which the issue can
rise on habeas has already passed adversely on the claim; this
rule evolved because it seems pointless to require repeated at-
tempts to convince that court that its view of the federal ques-
tion is improper. 7 The same rule should apply where the
USCMA has already considered the petitioner's claim. Second,
must military postconviction relief ordinarily be sought if the
USCMA has not passed on the issue? By analogy to review of
state court detentions, the answer would appear to be affirma-
tive.'78 Noyd v. Bond ' seems to require the same answer. There
the Supreme Court ruled that the habeas petitioner who sought
171 United States v. Frischholz, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 15o, 51, 36 C.M.R. 306, 307
(x966). In that case the USCMA, although denying relief on the merits, claimed
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the writ of coram nobis. The court declared
that it had "powers incidental to, and protective of, those defined in" its statutory
grant of jurisdiction, UCMJ art. 67(b). See Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135,
37 C.M.R. 399 (1967) (declaration of power to issue writs of habeas corpus and
mandamus; relief denied on the merits).
172 18 U.S.C.M.A. 7, 39 C.M.R. 7 (1968).
17 3 UCMJ art. 64.
171 UCMJ art. ig.
1
75 UCMJ art. 65(c); the sentence as commuted was not severe enough to
allow review under articles 66 or 67.
171 Most recently, in United States v. Bevilacqua, x8 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 11-12, 39
C.M.R. 10, 11-12 (1968) (petition for coram nobis denied on the merits), the
USCMA stated that it stood ready to accord extraordinary relief
to an accused who has palpably been denied constitutional rights in any
court-martial; . . . an accused who has been deprived of his rights need
not go outside the military justice system to find relief in the civilian courts
of the Federal judiciary.
177 See pp. 2o96-97 supra.
178 See pp. 1093-1103 supra.
179395 U.S. 683, 696 (1969).
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release in the civilian courts pending his military appeal should
first seek the writ from the USCMA, which had not yet con-
sidered his claim.
It would be inappropriate, however, to require exhaustion of
military postconviction relief in all cases in which the USCMA
had not once passed on the claim. Noyd was a case which was
ultimately subject to direct review by the USCMA. In requiring
exhaustion there, the Supreme Court noted that the writ to be
granted by the USCMA was "necessary or appropriate in aid of
[its jurisdiction]." 180 The Court pointed out that "a different
question would, of course, arise in a case which the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals is not authorized to review under the governing
statutes." 181 The implication is clear: the USCMA arguably has
no power to expand its jurisdiction by issuing extraordinary writs
in cases over which it has no eventual review power. 82 United
States v. Bevilacqua,'8 3 where the sentence was not severe enough
to warrant direct review by the USCMA, would be such a case.
A similar situation would be presented where the time for appeal
had run, even though the case was originally reviewable.' By
the reasoning in Noyd another similar problem would arise in a
case in which only a review of findings of fact is required. Since
the USCMA is restricted to reviewing matters of law,'8 5 arguably
relief predicated on fact review is not "in aid of [its] jurisdic-
tion." Exhaustion should not be required until it is clear, either
from congressional or Supreme Court action, that the USCMA is
lawfully empowered to grant the requested relief in the situa-
tion. 88 Moreover, doubts injected by Noyd as to the extent of
.80 All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 165i(a) (1964).
181395 U.S. at 695 n.7.
182 Those sentences which the USCMA can review without referral by JAG
are ones affecting a general or flag officer, or extending to dismissal of a commis-
sioned officer, cadet or midshipman, or extending to death, dishonorable discharge,
bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more. UCMJ arts. 66(b),
67(b).
133 z8 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 1o (1968); see note 176 supra.
"s, The USCMA claims power to grant relief in such circumstances. United
States v. Frischholz, x6 U.S.C.M.A. i5O, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966).1 8 2 UCMJ art. 67(d). However, the USCMA has construed its jurisdiction
broadly to reach matters of mixed law and fact, mislabeled questions of fact, find-
ings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence, and findings of fact when funda-
mental rights are involved. Note, supra note 72, at 1264.
186 There are some other, less substantial arguments against the validity of the
USCMA's power to grant postconviction relief which have not yet been de-
cided by the Supreme Court. These include the effect of the finality provision of
UCMJ art. 76, which is discussed in United States v. Frischholz, x6 U.S.C.M.A.
15O, 252, 36 C.M.R. 306, 307 (1966); and the possibly superseding effect of a
complete code such as the UCMJ on the inherent power to grant extraordinary
relief- an analogous argument based on new criminal codes has succeeded in some
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USCMA's powers, coupled with the paucity of intramilitary post-
conviction relief cases, leave today's petitioner unenlightened as
to the types of claims for which the USCMA will venture to give
any relief at all. It would be unfair to impose the delay exhaus-
tion entails when the availability and the legality of relief is so
doubtful. The appropriate analogies in review of state convic-
tions are those cases in which the state post-conviction remedy
is a procedural morass 187 or in which seeking the remedy is futile
because of prior state decisions. 88  In those sorts of cases,
exhaustion is properly not required.
In sum, exhaustion of the military postconviction remedy
should presently be required only when the claim has not yet
been passed on by the USCMA and arises in a case which the
USCMA can ultimately review - for this is the only situation in
which it can now be said with assurance that the petitioner can
get lawful relief if he is entitled to it. For two reasons, the
USCMA probably will often be voluntarily petitioned for relief
before federal habeas is sought. First, the range of issues cogniz-
able on military postconviction relief purportedly includes ex-
amination of all constitutional rights I'l and may include examin-
ation of evidentiary facts relevant to guilt, 10 an issue not cogniz-
able on habeas. 9' Second, the USCMA has neither imposed a
custody requirement 192 nor limited the type of relief available.9 3
Thus the USCMA should receive sufficient petitions for the further
development and clarification of its remedies, and the federal
courts should not often have to face the exhaustion problem.
(ii) Administrative Relief. - Since 1946 there has been an
administrative remedy whereby the secretary of a military de-
state courts, e.g., Randall v. Whitman, 88 Ga. App. 803, 78 S.E.2d 78 (2953);
Boyd v. Smyth, 200 Iowa 687, 693, 205 N.W. 522, 524 (1925), appeal dismissed,
270 U.S. 635 (1926).
117 See p. io98 supra.
... See pp. io98-xioo supra.
189 See note 176 supra.
190This can be done on review by coram nobis; see note 171 supra.
191 See, e.g., Martin v. Coiner, 299 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.W. Va. x969).
192 Indeed, Frischholz (see note 171 supra) was several years out of the Air
Force when he filed his petition for extraordinary relief. The court did not discuss
whether his dismissal from the service deprived it of jurisdiction. See United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. ii (x955) (court-martial lacks personal jurisdic-
tion over discharged soldier). Probably there is "no problem here since jurisdiction
over person is established either by the consent inherent in petitioning the court
for relief or by the original trial court's jurisdiction which continues, despite sub-
sequent dismissal, for the purposes of collateral attack. See Carter v. McClaughry,
183 U.S. 365, 383 (1902).
92 The USCMA evidently feels free to order discharge from confinement
by habeas or voiding of conviction by coram nobis; moreover, the availability of
mandamus promises great versatility of remedy, as does the "appropriate relief"
approach of Jones v. Ignatius.
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partment, acting through a board of correction, can "correct any
military record of that department when he considers it necessary
to correct an error or remove an injustice." 194 This power has
been considered to extend to court-martial judgments 1'5 despite
the finality provisions of UCMJ article 76 and its predecessors." 6
The original intention was that this relief should function as an
act of clemency comparable to, and in lieu of, a private act of
Congress; it does not affect the validity or conclusiveness of the
court-martial.9
A recent case, Ashe v. McNamara,9 8 suggested a new potential
of this administrative remedy for providing civilian court review
on constitutional issues. The court there held that the secretary
had violated a plain duty in failing to change a serviceman's dis-
charge from dishonorable to honorable when the court-martial
which had sentenced the discharge failed to meet due process
standards. Relief in the nature of mandamus 199 was found ap-
propriate. By thus subjecting the administrative remedy to
civ'ilian judicial review, the court seemed to promise a potent
complement to habeas and, in view of the court's disregard for
the military's consideration of the issue, an approach unhampered
by the restrictions of Burns. However, a later case 200 has taken
the logical step of equating the two forms of collateral attack by
applying the "fully and fairly" test 2 0 ' to this new remedy. Up
to now, so few courts have entertained such suits that the avail-
ability and limitation of judicial review of the administrative
action remain unfixed.20 2
When both remedies - habeas and administrative relief plus
judicial review - are available, the applicability of exhaustion
194Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, § 207, 6o Stat. 837, as
amended, io U.S.C. § 1552 (1964).
195 40 Op. Ar' Y GEN. 504 (1947).
29641 Or. Arr' GEN. 49 (1949); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 280 (1st
Cir. x965).
197 40 Op. ATr'Y Grit. 504, 508 (1947); Davis v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496, 497
(ist Cir. 1968) (dictum); Goldstein v. Johnson, 184 F.2d 342, 344 (D.C. Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879 (195o).
10 355 F.2d 277 (ist Cir. 1965). This case was cited with apparent approval
in United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 351 (ig6g).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
200 Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896, 900 (ioth Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 934 (i969).2 1 See pp. 215-16 supra.
202 One possible serious limitation is suggested by the fact that no case supports
the availability of the administrative remedy to effect one's freedom from jail;
most cases involve discharges, reinstatments, changes in recorded rank and the like.
Although a court-martial prison sentence seems almost as much a "military record"
as does a court-martial sentence of dishonorable discharge, a narrow construction of
"record" could mean that habeas and this administrative remedy are seldom alter-
native remedies posing an exhaustion problem.
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comes into question. Exhaustion of the administrative remedy
should not be required. It would be unfair to inflict on a prisoner
the double delay of a further military remedy and the subsequent
judicial review if he has already unsuccessfully pursued the full
direct review - which may, incidentally, include confirmation by
the secretary of the military department 203 - and perhaps has
also pursued the UCMJ article 73 petition for a new trial 204 as
well as any postconviction relief offered by the USCMA. Re-
quiring exhaustion would be ill-advised in light of the original
intent behind the extraordinary administrative remedy. Funnel-
ing all constitutional claims to the secretary before they are
heard by a habeas court would convert his function from one
similar to a governor's pardon in special cases to one where the
secretary and his advisors would have to act as an additional
military court in almost every constitutional case. °
B. Administrative Restraints
Historically, habeas corpus has been a far more effective rem-
edy for executive restraints than for confinements under the
sentence of a court. 0 6 While habeas review of a court judgment
was limited to the issue of the sentencing court's jurisdictional
competency, an attack on an executive order could raise all issues
relating to the legality of the detention. 20  The rationale of this
distinction has lost none of its force in the modern context even
though the federal habeas jurisdiction for criminal prisoners has
been significantly expanded: 20' habeas corpus provides the first
judicial scrutiny of detention by administrative agencies,2 9 whose
quasi-judicial decisions affect constitutional 210 and statutory 211
2 0 See UCMJ arts. 71(b), 74.
204 See p. 1232 & note 158 supra.
20 Not only is exhaustion of this new remedy undesirable, it may be unfeas-
ible. The Fifth Circuit recently held that mandamus can not properly issue if
another adequate remedy is available. Carter v. Seamans, 421 F.2d 767, 773 (1969)
(serviceman's alternate remedy was action in Court of Claims).
206 See p. io45 supra.
2
. See p. 1240 infra.2 08 See pp. IO45-62 supra.
209 See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (resident alien
sought habeas corpus to challenge administrative exclusion from United States upon
his return from voyage on an American ship); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 289
U.S. 86 (i9o3) (alien determined by immigration authorities to be illegally within
United States sought habeas corpus to obtain review of order of exclusion).
210See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (resident subject to
administrative order of deportation has constitutional right to de novo judicial
determination of claim of American citizenship- question goes to jurisdiction of
agency).
211 See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. xi, 393 U.S. 233
(2969) (injunctive relief sought to prevent induction into Armed Forces and to
correct selective service classification allegedly in violation of statutory require-
ment).
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